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ABSTRACT: Recent work on Lewis Carroll’s “What the Tortoise Said to Achilles” sheds light not 
just on cases where one fails to be persuaded when one should be but also on cases where people 
are persuaded when they should not be. The recognition of impossibility that Carroll’s paper 
illuminates can help to show what goes wrong with some of those addicted to conspiracy 
theories. 
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1. Introduction 
 
In perhaps the finest piece of rhetoric in the philosophy of logic, Lewis Carroll reports on a 
conversation between Zeno’s famous characters, the tortoise and his racing competitor, Achilles. 
Of course, the main focus of Carroll’s paper is to draw attention to an interesting feature of the 
nature of inference: the act of accepting that a conclusion follows from the premises of a valid 
argument differs from the act of accepting the truth of a proposition. Yet what this difference is 
turns out to be difficult to specify. In this paper I will suggest that recent work on understanding 
this difference might be helpful in seeing why some people who are particularly adept at making 
good deductive inference are, nevertheless, prone to falling for—indeed, being avid supporters 
of—highly implausible conspiracy theories. All that is offered here is a hypothesis—or model—
for why some highly skilled and intelligent people sometimes go so wrong.  
Unfortunately, I am not able to offer data to confirm or falisify the hypothesis or even to 
provide enough precision to say just what such data would have to be like. My hope is that 
getting to the hypothesis is reward enough for these shortcomings. 
 
2.  What Achilles Said 
 
In Lewis Carroll’s famous paper, “What the Tortoise said to Achilles” the tortoise wonders 
whether, when confronted with a pair of obviously true premises and an obviously valid 
deductive inference, he needs to accept the conclusion this inference warrants. Achilles makes 
the seemingly natural move of saying: if one accepts the premises and one accepts the rule of 
inference, one must accept the conclusion.  
The tortoise agrees with this, but then claims that this—the claim that if one accepts both 
the premises and the rule of inference then one must accept the conclusion—is an additional 
premise that he needs before he must accept the conclusion. The tortoise is, in effect, noting that 
there is a gap between premises and conclusion and is refusing to recognize that the premises 
entail the conclusion. The way Carroll has the tortoise put it is revealing, namely, the tortoise 
says that one could believe the premises without believing the conclusion. Of course, Achilles 
falls into the trap of suggesting to the tortoise that if one believed the premises and also believed 
that they entailed the conclusion, then one would have to believe the conclusion. This, the 
tortoise says, is an additional premise. And the regress is off and running. (For then one needs 
yet another premise saying that one needs to accept the original premises and the first additional 
premise saying that those premises entail the conclusion in order to finally accept the conclusion. 
And so on.) 
 
 
2.1 The Gap 
 
Let us begin by noting a few things. First, we all accept that there is something—perhaps it is 
properly called a gap—between premises and conclusion, and that it is this gap that is 
filled/bridged/covered by the inference.1 Second, we are dealing here with what Kahneman has 
called system 2 (or slow) reasoning. Third, good inferences tend to preserve truth. They do not—
 
1 From here on I will just call it the gap, but nothing hangs on the term being metaphorically superior to the alternatives. 
at least not normally—take one from truth to falsity.2 Fourth, we all know that there is—that 
there simply has to be—a solution to this problem. We just do not know precisely what it is or 
how to best characterize what it is.  
 
 
2.2 The Tortoise and the Turtle 
 
Here I want to consider a pair of testudines whom I will name Tortoise and Turtle. Tortoise 
behaves much like Carroll’s tortoise, refusing to accept conclusions even when they seem to 
follow from simple premises and obviously valid argument forms. Turtle, Tortoise’s swamp-
dwelling cousin, behaves quite differently in accepting almost any opportunity to leap across the 
gap between premises and conclusion. Let us look at how they each react to a couple of common 
deductive arguments. 
Consider modus ponens.  
Premise 1: If p then q.  
Premise 2: p.  
Conclusion: (Therefore) q. 
Turtle is happy to reach q on the basis of the two premises. Tortoise, in good Carrollian fashion, 
is unwilling to believe q simply on the basis of the two premises and an inference, though he 
accepts both the truth of the premises and (in some sense) the validity of the inference. 
In this case, we are all hoping that no one will fall into the trap that Achilles did by asking for or 
even allowing an additional premise that will only lead to a regress. 
 Now consider another argument, affirming the consequent (or modus morons). 
Premise 1: If p then q. 
Premise 2: q 
Conclusion: (Therefore) p. 
Turtle is happy to accept the conclusion on the basis of these premises and the bad inference. But 
should Tortoise be inclined to offer someone who rejects the conclusion an additional premise 
(such as: Surely if [If p then q] and [q] warrant [p] then p.)? It seems not. If we add this to the 
argument above (and we add conjunction), we have an instance of modus ponens. Clearly, this 
won’t do.  
 And the fact that it will not do shows us that the genius of Carroll’s argument is not so 
much tied up with the fact that the tortoise can get Achilles into an infinite regress. Of course, 
unless one recognizes the fact that (at least sometimes)3 when arguments have valid logical 
forms, accepting the premises requires—rationally requires—one to accept the conclusion 
without anything further being added, then a regress looms. Rhetorically speaking, the regress is 
an impressive touch. But the real insight is that there is a must involved here. If one accepts the 
premises of a simple valid deductive argument, then one must accept the conclusion—not just 
because failure to do so leads to an infinite regress but because failure to do so amounts to either 
not really accepting the validity of the inference or not fully understanding the premises. 
 
2 The “not normally” here is needed because sometimes perfectly good inductive inferences will do this. And there 
may be deductive ones that fail when dealing with weird circumstances such as some forms of the liar paradox. I leave 
these vexing issues aside. 
3 This qualification is needed because there are some complex arguments where one might accept the fact that taking 
the premises to be true and the inference to be valid might not rationally require one to accept that the conclusion must 
then be true.  
  
2.3 Taking 
 
Paul Boghossian has put this feature in terms of what he calls the Taking Condition. He begins 
his discussion with Frege’s observation that “To make a judgment because we are cognisant of 
other truths as providing a justification for it is known as inferring” (page 3). Of course, it need 
not be truths (or true beliefs) that are the basis of a judgment that we use inference to justify 
other judgments. False claims (or false beliefs), if accepted as true, can serve as the basis for a 
judgment using valid inferences.4 Furthermore, it may be that cognition is something of a success 
term (which would perhaps beg or conflate some questions). For these reasons, Boghossian uses 
the following modification of Frege’s original statement of the position: 
(Inferring) S’s inferring from p to q is for S to judge q because S takes the 
(presumed) truth of p to provide support for q. 
And this leads to Boghossian’s final statement of the taking condition: 
(Taking Condition): Inferring necessarily involves the thinker taking his 
premises to support his conclusion and drawing his conclusion because 
of that fact. 
For present purposes, I am going to assume that Boghossian’s arguments for this account of the 
Taking Condition correctly capture what is going on when someone reaches a conclusion on the 
basis of premises she accepts and of something she (correctly) takes as a deductively valid rule 
of inference. Of course, the exact nature, the sense, of both the taking and the because here are 
very difficult to specify. However, here I will simply suppose (in line with Boghossian’s 
thinking) that the taking is full rational understanding and the because is some form of rational 
causation.  
 
3. Taking and seeing 
 
Another way of looking at this comes from a helpful recent suggestion by Eric Marcus. He 
observes that people cannot seriously assent to an obvious contradiction. No one believes that (p 
and not-p). No one can assent to the pair of assertions {p, not-p}.  
Of course, there may be exceptions. But they all involve some explanation which roughly 
takes the form of explaining why someone mistakenly believes or assents to something which 
they really rationally cannot believe. I might continue to rush through the storm towards school 
to give my 10:00 a.m. lecture even though I have just heard that school has been closed due to 
the inclement weather. Or a person might fail to realize that the claim they allegedly believe 
really is an instance of a contradiction. (I might well believe that [Water is water and it is not the 
case that water is H2O], but this is only because I fail to see it as a contradiction.)5 One might 
have contradictory beliefs about instances of the Liar Paradox or other cases involving self-
reference. And the Paradox of the Preface is so named because there is something paradoxical—
indeed, something which seems impossible—about, in a careful and considered way, believing a 
contradiction. Yet what authors write when they say something philosophers count as actual 
 
4 An example might help here. Suppose that one were to infer that Sheldon got his paper to John on time from the 
premise that Sheldon got his paper to John on time. Clearly, if one accepted the premise, one would have to accept 
the conclusion. But (as John will attest), while the premise is obviously false, the inference is just fine. 
5 No one believes that [water is and is not water] or that [water is H2O and is not H2O]. 
instances of the Paradox of the Preface seems quite reasonable. I will return to this last case 
below. 
As Marcus observes, to fully understand that something is a contradiction is to know that 
it is necessarily false. And when one knows something is false, one cannot believe it. This both 
explains why and serves to confirm the fact that we do not know what attitude to ascribe to 
someone who claims to believe what we see to be a simple contradiction. Note how different this 
is from someone claiming to believe some simple claim that we believe to be contingently false. 
Even when we have an enormous amount of evidence for p, such that it is just obvious to us that 
p is true, we understand what mental attitude the person who claims to believe not-p has. We will 
wonder why they believe something we take to be so obviously false, but we have no trouble 
understanding the nature of their belief—at least no more trouble than we have understanding 
any belief any person has. But we do not know what to say about the person who claims to 
believe p and, at the same time and in the same sense, to believe not-p. Indeed, when confronted 
with such situations, we are inclined to abandon belief ascriptions and use medical terminology.6 
 
3.1 The Paradox of the Preface 
 
Let me consider a toy case of the paradox of the preface. Suppose that our author—a non-
philosopher—has done careful research and fact checking on a certain matter. She collects this 
information into 10,000 claims about the matter. She is quite sure of each claim. Indeed, she 
would assign a probability of over 99.9% to the truth of each individual claim. But knowing that 
she is fallible, she writes in the preface to her book, “I have diligently checked each of the claims 
in my book and I am confident that each one is correct. However, I know that likely somewhere 
in the book there is a false claim. A reader who finds such a claim should bring it to my 
attention.” 
 There both is and is not something paradoxical about claims that constitute instances of 
the paradox of the preface. The paradox just consists in the realization that there is an 
inconsistency in believing that each claim is true (and in conjunction, that hence they are all true) 
and in thinking that at least one is false. On the other hand, the paradox of the preface does not 
seem to pose quite the deep philosophical problem that the liar paradox poses. Why is this? I 
think it is mainly because we fully understand that, with larger numbers of claims, the level of 
confidence that all are true just naturally decreases (As well it should. Surely, with 10,000 claims 
at least one error is bound to slip in. Perhaps a “not” gets added or deleted in the typesetting. Or a 
“1918’ becomes an “1819”. Or something like that.) Note that our author is not in any way 
doubting that conjunction is a valid inference rule. She has no trouble inferring from the fact that 
each member of a set of claims is true to the set of them being true. Not being philosophically 
inclined, Carroll’s tortoise would be dismissed by our author without a further thought (other 
than something like, “Those philosophers sure worry about weird stuff”). 
 In ordinary life, we philosophers all behave this way. When we get into our cars, we 
automatically put on our seatbelts.7 But one can think of such behavior as paradoxical. Surely 
either one thinks that on this trip one will not be in an accident or one will be in an accident. But 
if one thinks one is not going to have an accident, one has no reason to wear one’s seatbelt. And 
 
6 We might say, for instance, that the person doesn’t mean what she is saying, or that she does not understand, or that 
she has lost her marbles or has some psychological problem. 
7 In this respect we behave like Hume did when his philosophic reasonings produced both melancholy and delirium. 
Hume turned to eating, playing games, and chatting with friends for relief (Treatise Book 1 Section 7). 
if one thinks that one will be in an accident, one will not take the trip. So either one doesn’t take 
the trip or one thinks there is no need to wear the seatbelt. But we all do take automotive trips, 
and we (mostly) all wear our seatbelts.8  
  
  
3.2 Blocking 
 
Recognition that something is a contradiction necessarily blocks one from believing the (alleged) 
fact because one sees that one cannot simultaneously believe both something and its denial. Let 
us call the awareness of the impossibility of believing a contradiction the Blocking Condition.  
 The intuition supporting the Blocking Condition is in most ways the same as that which 
supports the Taking Condition. In the case of the Taking Condition, there is a must which (once 
recognized) cannot be avoided. With the Blocking Condition there is a cannot which (once 
recognized) prevents one from adopting a belief. But the idea that a full understanding of the 
claims involved necessarily leads any rational individual to some other attitude is the same. In 
the case of the Taking Condition, it is the recognition that when one has a full understanding of 
the premises one is necessarily required to accept the conclusion. With the Blocking condition it 
is the recognition of the contradiction which necessarily prohibits one from believing the 
contradiction. Fully rational people are, by virtue of their rationality, blocked from believing 
things they recognize to be contractions. 
 
4. Mutilating the web of belief 
 
Our beliefs form a web, and a lot of the beliefs that make up any individual’s web are not ones 
she arrived at by deduction. She got them through other means. Perhaps some are innate, others 
were arrived through direct experience, others by induction, or from authorities, or from 
indoctrination, or through clever advertising, or in some other way (perhaps many other ways).9 
Sometimes this web is disturbed. A new belief—or evidence for a new belief—is such 
that we must adopt the belief even though this new belief contradicts or is in tension with beliefs 
already in our web. In such circumstances, most of us implicitly follow Quine’s maxim of 
minimum mutilation.10 We seek to modify or rescind our existing beliefs in that way that upsets 
as few beliefs as possible—and especially in ways that upset as few core beliefs as possible.  
But Quine taught us—or is widely thought to have taught us—that if you are willing to 
make enough changes in your beliefs, then you can keep any part of the web you want. Of 
course, Quine himself preferred to keep things scientific and simple. But at least some have 
understood him as holding the view that this was just a preference he happened to have. One 
might prefer metaphysical jungles rather than Quinean desert landscapes; indeed, this is a salient 
difference between Quine and Ockham. Ockham did not just prefer simplicity over complexity. 
Rather, he thought one should only move toward more complexity if it was needed in order to 
 
8 One might say that one puts on one’s seatbelt to avoid the probability of a ticket for failing to do so. Fine, but imagine 
you are in a jurisdiction without such legislation. For those of you who would rather I had virtue signalled here 
substitute putting on one’s helmet (in a jurisdiction without mandatory helmet laws) when one goes for a ride on one’s 
cycle. 
9 For present purposes I wish to remain entirely neutral on the ways in which a person acquires beliefs. If some are 
spread by viruses or inserted by God, it makes no difference to my argument here. 
10 Quine 1990, page 14-15. Quine seems think that much “is the mutilation the maxim of minimum mutilation is meant 
to minimize”. 
handle the relevant data. Furthermore, one can determine whether more complexity is needed 
when a simple explanation does not contribute to our justified confidence in both the explanans 
and the explanandum. Thus, the existence of Neptune explains (that is, is the simplest 
explanation of) the wobble in Uranus’s orbit, and that explanation helps confirm the existence of 
Neptune (and our beliefs about its mass and orbit).11 
Philosophers are, of course, willing to entertain the wildest of theories. Indeed, the 
history of philosophy (at least the canon of Western philosophy) can easily be read as a bunch of 
brilliant people defending what at first glance seem to be rather bizarre views about the nature of 
reality. Nevertheless, they all are constrained by rationality and consistency and the need to 
maintain a web of beliefs that cohere in interesting and insightful ways.  
 
5. The conspiracy theorists’ success and failure 
Many conspiracy theories are boring. They include obvious instances of bad reasoning or simple 
factual errors and misunderstandings. But some conspiracy theorists are really quite good at 
advancing clever arguments for their strange positions. It is this latter group which interests me 
here. How should we best characterize what goes wrong with the thinking of such individuals? 
Clearly, they are like neither Carroll’s tortoise (or my Tortoise) or my Turtle. Unlike Tortoise 
they are willing to make inferences, each of which is fully warranted by the standards of logic 
and critical thinking. They distain the sort of reasoning in which Turtle engages. One might 
say—indeed I do say—that they adhere to our standards when it comes to defending the 
inferences needed to support their strange theories. It cannot be the strangeness which bothers us, 
nor the quality of each inference, nor the fact that the theories in question are conspiracy theories 
(for some conspiracy theories are true). It has to be something else.  
 My suggestion is that it is a combination of being good at rigorous application of the 
Taking Condition together with a special skill at recognizing and avoiding the Blocking 
Condition. Typically, when one hears (an apparently obviously false) conspiracy theory, one is 
inclined to think that the theory must contradict some part of our (shared) web of belief. But the 
clever conspiracy theorist has the skill to make sure that each step in her theory is supported by 
an inference which—by our standards—is fully warranted. We take her premises to require us to 
move to the next step in her story. 
 But we non-conspiracy theorists see that, at some point, the conspiracy theorist’s account 
is going to be blocked. The Blocking Condition will rationally require one not to accept 
something in the theorist’s account. But the better the conspiracy theorist is, the better she will be 
at showing how, at each particular point where one would think there would be a conflict with 
the web of belief, that conflict can be avoided. And the better the conspiracy theorist is, the less 
she has to disturb our web.12 The trick of the really good conspiracy theorist is to anticipate 
something that will block her story and avoid getting even close to that. 
 And this tells us something about the Blocking Condition. It does not just apply to fine-
grained individual beliefs. We are blocked—that is, rationality does not permit; rationality 
necessarily forbids—our accepting an account of reality which requires too much modification of 
our web of belief just for the sake of the conspiracy theorist’s story. Although the clever 
conspiracy theorist can avoid contradictions at each step along the way, we see that she will not 
 
11 I owe the example to Duncan MacIntosh. For the interpretation of Qckham, see Martin and Kaye On Ockham. I 
thank Robert Martin for sorting this out for me. 
12 The conspiracy theorist who, denying the standard story about the World Trade Center collapse, begins her account 
by saying that people do suffer from visual hallucinations is not an interesting theorist. 
be able to avoid them all without doing too much damage to our web in exchange for insufficient 
benefit. We might say that the talented conspiracy theorist is able to bridge each gap in her 
account of why something is best explained as a conspiracy, but that (from our perspective) her 
account is blocked by the extent to which her story would require us to restructure our web of 
belief.  
 
6. Conclusion 
 
At the beginning of his Philosophical Explanations, Robert Nozick fanaticizes about having 
“arguments so powerful they set up reverberations in the brain: if the person refuses to accept the 
conclusion, he dies.” Yet even this might not be strong enough, for, as he observes, this still 
leaves the option of not accepting the conclusion and thus dying. But a “‘perfect’ philosophical 
argument would leave no [such] choice” (page 4). Of course, most of us, most of the time, do not 
have such fantasies when engaged in argumentation. But seeing otherwise rational, extremely 
clever, and well-trained reasoners waste time and energy defending (sometimes with elegance 
and apparent ease) what we take to be absurd conspiracy theories does help one appreciate 
Nozick’s desire for really powerful argument. But it is vain to hope for such arguments. Clever 
conspiracy theorists, like Carroll’s tortoise, simply do not see the necessity (the must or the 
cannot) which the rest of us see. The best we can hope for is to understand what we see that they 
(apparently) do not. 
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